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1^1  MEMORANDA  ON  CUBA. 

July  12,  191 2. 
Article    111   of  the  treaty  of    1903   between  .the  United 
States   and    Cuba   (which    incorporates    the   so-tailed    Piatt 
Amendment)  reads  as  follows: 

"That  the  Government  of  Cuba  consents  that  the  United 
States  may  exercise  the  right  to  intervene  for  the  preservation 
of  Cuban  independence,  the  maintenance  of  a  government  ade- 
quate for  the  protection  of  life,  property,  and  individual  liberty, 
and  for  discharging  the  obligations  with  respect  to  Cuba  imposed 
by  the  treaty  of  Paris  on  the  United  States,  now  to  be  assumed 
and  undertaken  by  the  Government  of  Cuba." 

It  will  be  observed  that  the  treaty  provision  may  be 
analyzed  as  follows : 

1.  The  treaty  stipulates  that  "the  Government  of  Cuba 
consents  that  the  United  States  may  exercise  the  right  to 
intervene",  etc. 

II.   The  Government  of  Cuba  consents  to  the  exercise 
of  this  rijrht  of  intervention — 
•     I.   "For  the  preservation  of  Cuban  independence". 

2.  For  "the  maintenance  of  a  government  adequate — 
{a)   "  For    the    protection    of    life,    property,    and 

individual  liberty",  and 

{b)   "For  discharging  the  obligations  with  respect 

to  Cuba  imposed    by  the  treaty  of   Paris 

on  the  United  States,  now  to  be  assumed 

and    undertaken    b\-   the   Government    of 

Cuba." 

With  reference  to  I,  supra,  it  will   be  observed  thai  the 

.treaty  provision  is  not  ?i  grant  of  a  right  but  a  consent  to  the 

exercise  of  a   right.      In   other  words,  the   treaty  distinctly 

recognizes  the  rio;ht  of  the  United   States  to  intervene  irre- 

spective  of  the  terms  of  the   treaty  itself,  the   treaty  stipula- 


tion  being  nothing  more  than  an  anticipatory  consent  of  the 
Cuban  Government  to  the  exercise  of  that  right.  The 
treaty,  therefore,  need  not  be  primarily  invoked  to  estabHsh 
the  right  of  intervention,  but  only  to  meet  any  objection 
which  the  Government  of  Cuba  might  at  any  time  be  dis- 
posed to  raise,  in  the  absence  of  such  a  treaty  stipulation,  to 
the  exercise  of  such  admitted  rights. 

In  this  connection  it  is  of  interest  to  call  attention  to 
the  statements  made  in  the  letter  from  Secretarv  of  War 
Root  to  Governor  Wood,  of  February  9,  1901  (while  the 
Cuban  Constitutional  Convention  was  drafting  the  Consti- 
tution of  Cuba),  in  which  the  Secretary  of  War  set  forth 
certain  provisions  which  "the  people  of  Cuba  should  desire 
to  have  incorporated  in  their  fundamental  law",  with  a  state- 
ment that  while  these  provisions  might  not  be  ultimately 
adopted  by  our  own  Congress  they  should  be  binding  upon 
Governor  Wood  as  the  expressions  of  the  Executive  on  the 
matters  covered. 

The  third  of  the  provisions  submitted  recited: 

"That  upon  the  transfer  of  the  control  of  Cuba  to  the  Gov- 
ernment established  under  the  new  constitution,  Cuba  consents 
that  the  United  States  reserve  and  retain  the  right  oi  intervention 
for  the",  etc.,   etc.      (See  attached  memorandum.) 

In  connection  with  this  question,  reference  should  also 
be  made  to  President  McKinley's  message  of  December  5, 
1899,  in  which,  speaking  of  the  relationship  between  the 
United  States  and  Cuba,  he  said: 

"This  nation  has  assumed  before  the  world  a  grave  responsi- 
bility for  the  future  good  government  of  Cuba.  We  have 
accepted  a  trust  the  fulfillment  of  which  calls  for  the  sternest 
integrity  of  purpose  and  the  exercise  of  the  highest  wisdom. " 
(For.  Rels.,  1899,  p.  xxix.) 

Again,  as  was  said  by  Secretary  of  War  Root  in  the  let- 
ter above  referred  to  — 

"The  United  States  has,  and  will  always  have,  the  most 
vital  interest  in  the  preservation  of  that  island  from  the  domi- 
nation and   control  of  any  foreign  power  whatever.      The  pres- 


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ervation  of  that  independence  by  a  country  so  small  as  Cuba,  so 
incapable,  as  she  must  always  be,  to  contend  by  force  against 
the  great  powers  of  the  world,  must  depend  upf>n  her  strict 
performance  of  international  obligations,  upon  her  giving  due 
protection  to  the  lives  and  property  of  the  citizens  of  all  other 
countries  within  her  borders,  and  upon  her  never  contracting 
any  public  debt  which  in  the  hands  of  citizens  of  foreign  powers 
shall  constitute  an  obligation  she  is  unable  to  meet.  The 
United  States  has,  therefore,  not  merely  a  moral  obligation 
arising  from  her  destruction  of  Spanish  authority  in  Cuba  and 
the  obligations  of  the  Treaty  of  Paris  for  the  establishment  of  a 
stable  and  adequate  government  in  Cuba,  but  it  has  a  sub- 
stantial interest  in  the  maintenance  of  such  a  government. 

"We  are  placed  in  a  position  where,  for  our  own  protection, 
we  have,  by  reason  of  e.xpelling  Spain  from  Cuba,  become  the 
guarantors  of  Cuban  independence  and  the  guarantors  of  a  stable 
and  orderly  government  protecting  life  and  property  in  that 
island. " 

It  will  be  observed  that  these  principles  were  announced 
before  the  enactment  of  the  Piatt  Amendment,  therefore 
before  the  adoption  of  the  Piatt  Amendment  in  the  Cuban 
Constitution,  and  therefore  obviously  before  the  adoption  of 
the  Piatt  Amendment  in  the  form  of  a  convention  between 
the  two  Governments. 

It  is  therefore  submitted  that,  upon  reason  and  upon 
principle,  as  well  as  upon  the  wording  of  the  convention 
itself,  the  right  of  the  United  States  to  intervene  in  affairs 
in  Cuba  comes  from  .sources  other  than  the  Piatt  Amend- 
ment, or  the  Constitution  of  Cuba,  or  from  the  provisions  of 
the  treaty  of  1903;  and  that  the  Cuban  Constitution  and 
the  conventional  undertakings  do  no  more,  and  in  terms 
profess  to  do  no  more,  than  to  give  Cuba's  consent  to  the 
exercise  of  such  rights. 

The  fact  that  wc  ha\'c  fundamental  interests  in  Cuba 
which  are  not  the  subject  of  treaty  or  other  grant  and  which 
exist  independently  thereof  is  specitically  admitted  in  Article 
V  of  the  treaty  of  1903,  which  recognizes  but  does  not 
create  the  interest  of  the  United  States  and  its  people  in  the 
sanitation  of  Cuba,  and  in  Article  \'1I,  which  likewise  recog- 
nizes but  does  not  create  the  interest  (that  arises  out  of  the 
imperative    necessities    of    self-defense)    which    the    United 


,  States  has  in  tlie  mainienance  on  Cuban  soil  of  coaling  and 
naval  stations. 

Moreover,  it  may  well  be,  and  such  is  probably  the  fact, 
that  neither  the  Piatt  Amendment,  the  constitution,  nor  the 
treatv  is  to  be  res^arded  as  containing  a  schedule  of  all  of  the 
conditions  and  circumstances  under  which  this  Government 
has  the  rigJit  to  intervene,  and  that  it  may  well  be  that 
conditions  will  arise  where  it  will  be  necessary  for  this  Gov- 
ernment to  intervene  in  the  affairs  of  Cuba  under  conditions 
not  specified  in  anv  of  the  documents  named. 

Before  passing  to  the  second  phase  of  this  discussion,  it 
seems  desirable  to  consider  the  meaning  of  the  word  "inter- 
vene" as  that  term  is  used  in  international  parlance. 

Hall  states  that — 

"  Intervention  takes  place  when  a  state  interferes  in  the  rela- 
tions of  two  other  states  without  tl^e  consent  of  both  or  either 
of  them,  or  when  it  interferes  in  the  domestic  affairs  of  another 
state  irrespectively  of  the  will  of  the  latter  for  the  purpose  of 
either  maintaining  or  altering  the  actual  condition  of  things 
within  it.  *  *  *  In  the  case  moreover  of  intervention  in  the 
internal  affairs  of  a  state,  it  is  generally  directed  only  against  a 
party  within  the  state,  or  against  a  particular  form  of  state  life, 
and  it  is  frequently  carried  out  in  the  interest  of  the  government 
or  of  persons  belonging  to  the  invaded  state.  It  is  therefore 
compatible  with  friendship  towards  the  state  as  such,  and  it  may 
be  a  pacific  measure,  which  becomes  war  in  the  intention  of  its 
authors  only  when  resistance  is  offered,  not  merely  by  persons 
within  the  state  and  professing  to  represent  it,  but  by  the  state 
through  the  persons  whom  the  invading  power  chooses  to  look 
upon  as  its  authorized  agents.""  (Hall,  International  Law,  sixth 
edition,  p.  278.) 

The  pertinent  comments  made  by  VVestlake  are  in  the 
following  language: 

"The  term  intervention  is  used  in  international  law  to  ex- 
press two  very  different  cases  of  political  action.  One  is  the 
interference  of  a  state  in  affairs  pending  between  two  or  more 
other  states,  the  other  is  the  interference  of  a  state  in  the  in- 
ternal affairs  of  another  state.      *     *     * 

"Intervention  in  the  internal  affairs  of  another  state  is  jus- 
tifiable in  two  classes  of  cases.      The  first  is  when   the  object  is 


to  put  down  a  government  which  attacks  the  peace,  external  or 
internal,  of  foreign  countries,  or  of  which  the  conduct  or 
avowed  policy  amounts  to  a  standing  threat  of  such  an  attack. 
The  second  is  when  a  country  has  fallen  into  such  a  condition 
of  anarchy  or  misrule  as  unavoidably  to  disturb  the  peace,  ex- 
ternal or  internal  of  its  neighbors,  whatever  the  conduct  or 
policy  of  its  government  may  be  in  that  respect. 

******* 

"In  considering  anarchy  and  misrule  as  a  ground  for  inter- 
vention the  view  must  not  be  confined  to  the  physical  conse- 
quences which  they  may  have  beyond  the  limits  of  the  territory 
in  which  they  rage.  Those  are  often  serious  enough,  such  as 
the  frontier  raids  in  which  anarchy  often  boils  over,  or  the 
piracy  that  may  arise  in  seas  in  which  an  enfeebled  government 
can  no  longer  maintain  the  rule  of  law.  The  moral  effect  on 
the  neighboring  populations  is  to  bfe  taken  into  account.  Where 
these  include  considerable  numbers  allied  by  religion,  language 
or  race  to  the  populations  suffering  from  misrule,  to  restrain 
the  former  from  giving  support  to  the  latter  in  violation  of  the 
legal  rights  of  the  misruled  state  may  be  a  task  beyond  the 
power  of  their  government,  or  requiring  it  to  resort  to  modes 
of  constraint  irksome  to  its  subjects,  and  not  necessary  for  their 
good  order  if  they  were  not  excited  by  the  spectacle  of  miseries 
which  they  must  feel  acutely.  It  is  idle  to  argue  in  such  a  case 
that  the  duty  of  the  neighboring  people  is  to  look  on  quietly. 
Laws  are  made  for  men  and  not  for  creatures  of  the  imagina- 
tion, and  they  must  not  create  or  tolerate  for  them  situations 
which  are  beyond  the  endurance,  we  will  not  say  of  average 
human  nature,  since  laws  may  fairly  expect  to  raise  the  stand- 
ard by  their  operation,  but  of  the  best  human  nature  that  at  the 
time  and  place  they  can  hope  to  meet  witli.  It  would  be  out- 
side our  scope  to  pass  judgment  on  present  or  recent  cases,  but 
it  is  by  these  principles  that  we  must  try  such  interventions  as 
have  taken  place  in  Turkey,  or  as  that  of  the  United  States  in 
Cuba."      (I  Westlake  International  Law,  pp.  304-306.) 

Hallcck  seems  to  classify  intervention  into  two  sorts — 
armed  intervention  and  pacific  intervention,  which  latter  he 
speaks  of  as  "  interference",  and  upon  whicli  hr  makes  the 
following  comment : 

"The  principal  grounds  upon  which  such  interference  has 
been  justified  are:  first,  self-defence;  second,  tlie  obligations 
of    treaty  stipulations;  third,    humanity;  and   fourth,  the  invi- 


tation  of  the  contending  parties  in  a  civil  war.  We  will  here 
examine  each  of  these  grounds,  with  respect  to  pacific  inter- 
ference reserving  for  another  place  a  discussion  of  how  far 
thev  will  justify  a  resort  to  force  or  a  war  of  intervention." 

Calvo,  in  liis   Dictionaire  de   Droit   International,  makes 
the  followinc:  definition  of  the  term   "intervention": 

"In  international  law,  intervention  signifies  the  interposi- 
tion of  one  state  in  the  affairs  of  other  states. 

"The  different  species  of  intervention  are  distinguished 
according  to  the  forms  under  which  they  occur;  (i)  Unofficial 
intervention,  which  is  exercised  by  oral  or  written  representa- 
tions or  by  so  called  notes  verbale:  one  may  consequently  call  it 
also  diplomatic  intervention;  (2)  Official  intervention,  which  is 
exercised  by  notes  delivered  publicly;  (3)  Pacific  or  arbitral 
intervention;  (4)  Armed  intervention,  which  manifests  itself  by 
a  simple  menace  supported  by  tlie  employment  of  military 
force."  (See  Pradier  Fodere,  vol.  i,  sec.  363,  for  the  same  dis- 
tinction as  to  pacific  and  armed  intervention.) 

These  definitions,  which  may  be  almost  indefinitely  mul- 
tiplied, make  it  perfectly  clear  that  the  term  "intervention" 
includes  not  merely  the  use  of  armed  forces  or  the  military 
occupation  of  a  country,  but  that  it  comprises  also  such 
pacific  measures  as  may  in  any  case  be  taken  by  a  govern- 
ment in  its  interference  with  the  internal  domestic  affairs  of 
another  government. 

It  therefore  follows  naturally  that  this  Government  may 
iiitervene  in  Cuba  in  other  ways  than  by  landing  forces  and 
undertaking  a  military  occupation,  and  that  by  its  constitu- 
tion and  the  treaty  the  Government  of  Cuba  has  given  an 
anticipatory  consent  to  such  intervention. 

With  reference  to  II,  supra,  it  will  be  observed,  as 
already  pointed  out,  that  the  rights  recognized  are  desig- 
nated under  two  headings,  as  follows: 

1.   Intervention   "for  the  preservation  of  Cuban  independence.  " 

No  argument  is  necessary  to  establish  that  the  interven- 
tion here  contemplated,  whether  it  be  pacific  or  armed,  is  to 
be  exercised  for  the  purpose  oi  preserving  Qwh^iW  independ- 
ence and  not  for  the  purpose  of  restoring  it.     This  being 


true,  it  is  the  riijht  of  tiie  Government  of  the  United  States, 
to  the  exercise  of  which  right  Cuba  has  consented,  to  inter- 
vene in  Cuban  affairs  by  either  warhke  or  pacific  measures, 
whenever  it  considers  that  conditions  arise  threatening  the 
independence  of  Cuba,  in  order  that  such  independence  may 
be  preserved.  It  need  not  wait  until  the  independence  is 
lost  before  acting.  That  is  to  sa\',  to  make  use  of  a  homely 
illustration,  the  barn  door  is  to  be  locked  before  and  not 
after  the  horse  is  stolen. 

In  connection  willi  this  comment  the  terms  of  Article 
VII  of  the  treaty  should  be  considered,  which  provide  as 
follows : 

"To  enable  the  United  States  to  maintain  the  independence 
of  Cuba,  and  to  protect  the  people  thereof,  as  well  as  for  its 
own  defences,  the  Government  of  Cuba  will  sell  or  lease  to  the 
United  States  lands  necessary  for  coaling  or  naval  stations,  at 
certain  specified  points,  to  be  agreed  upon  with  the  President  of 
the  United  States." 

Reference  is  made  to  the  comments  already  set  forth 
upon  the  significance  of  this  stipulation. 

2.   Intervention    for    "the    maintenance  of    a    government 

adequate" — 

{a)   ''For  the  protection  of  life,  property,  and  individual 

liberty''. 

Attention  is  called  here  to  the  fact  that  this  stipulation, 
like  the  one  preceding,  contemplates  preventive  measures  and 
not  measures  of  restoration — that  is  to  say,  the  treaty  recog- 
nizes the  rieht  of  this  Government  to  intervene  to  maintain 
a  government  adequate  for  the  purposes  named,  and  not 
merelv  to  intervene  to  reestablish  a  government  of  retjuired 
effectiveness.  In  other  words,  Cuba  has  consented  that  this 
Government  shall  intervene  not  to  reestablish  an  efficient 
government,  but  to  preserve  and  maintain  an  efficient  gov- 
ernment. So  that  whenever,  in  tlie  estimation  of  this  Gov- 
ernment, the  maintenance  of  a  government  adequate  for  the 
protection  of  life,  property,  and  liberty  in  Cuba  is  threatened, 


8 

the  Government  of  Cuba  has  consented  that  the  Government 
of  the  United  States  shall  intervene  for  the  purpose  of  main- 
taining such  a  government,  and  from  the  discussion  already 
had  it  must  be  admitted  that  such  intervention  may  be  either 
pacific  or  by  force  of  arms. 

(p)  ''For  discJiargmg  the  obligations  with  respect  to  Cuba  im- 
posed by  the  treaty  of  Paris  on  the  United  States,  now  to 
be  assumed  and  undertaken  by  the  Government  of  CubaT 

Secretary  of  War  Root,  in  his  letter  dated  February  9, 
1 90 1,  and  already  referred  to,  to  Military  Governor  Wood, 
said  : 

''The  treat}'  of  peace  concluded  at  Paris  on  the  loth  of 
December,  1898,  provides  in  the  first  article  that  'as  the  island 
is,  upon  its  evacuation  by  Spain,  to  be  occupied  by  the  United 
States,  the  United  States  will,  so  long  as  such  occupation  shall 
last,  assume  and  discharge  the  obligations  that  may,  under 
international  law,  result  from  the  fact  of  its  occupation  for  the 
protection  of  life  and  property.' 

"  It  contains  numerous  obligations  on  the  part  of  the  United 
States  in  respect  of  the  treatment  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  ter- 
ritory relinquished  by  Spain,  such  as  the  provision  of  the  tenth 
article,  that  the  inhabitants  shall  be  secured  in  the  free  exercise 
of  their  religion;  of  the  eleventh  article,  that  they  sliall  be  sub- 
ject to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  courts,  pursuant  to  the  ordinary 
laws  governing  the  same;  and  of  the  ninth  article,  that  they 
shall  retain  all  their  rights  of  property,  including  the  right  to 
dispose  thereof,  and  the  right  to  carry  on  their  industry,  com- 
merce, and  professions.  The  sixteenth  article  of  the  treaty 
provides  that  the  obligations  assumed  in  the  treaty  by  the 
United  States  with  respect  to  Cuba  are  limited  to  the  time  of 
its  occupancy  thereof,  but  that  it  shall,  upon  the  termination 
of  such  occupancy,  advise  any  government  established  in  the 
island  to  assume  the  same  obligations." 

The  treaty  provision  as  above  quoted,  therefore,  consents, 
on  the  part  of  Cuba,  to  the  intervention  by  the  United 
States  whenever  such  intervention  becomes  necessary  to 
secure  the  discharge  of  these  obligations,  and,  under  the  dis- 
cussion already  set  forth  above,  it  is  clear  that  such  interven- 
tion may  be  either  pacific  or  military. 


It  is  fundamental  Id  the  pi  iiiciplcs  of  intervention  and  to 
the  ri^rlits,  duties,  and  ohliij^ations  llowing  therefrom,  that 
tlie  time,  occasion,  and  manner  of  intervention  must  be 
determineci  by  the  intervening  state  or  states.  This  follows 
naturally  from  the  hypothesis,  which  is  also  the  fact,  that 
any  and  all  interference  by  one  state  in  the  internal  or  exter- 
nal affairs  of  another  is  an  exception  to  the  fundamental 
doctrine  of  the  equality  and  absolute  independence,  one  from 
another,  of  states  ;  and  from  the  further  fact  that,  c\\  hypotheca, 
interference  is  to  remedy  evils  which  threaten  the  interfering 
state,  which  state  obviously  can  alone,  and  must  alone,  deter- 
mine when  such  evils  threaten  and  the  methods  it  will  adopt 
to  obviate  them. 

If  a  disposition  should  appear  to  argue  that  while  the 
above  is  a  correct  statement  of  the  principles  governing 
intervention  in  the  absence  of  treaty,  nevertheless  where  a 
treaty  authorization  or  consent  is  involved  it  is  necessarv  (a 
treaty  being  a  bilateral  contract)  that  the  two  (rovernments 
parties  thereto  should  be  in  agreeement  as  to  the  time,  the 
occasion,  and  the  manner  of  intervention,  it  may  be  replied 
that  quite  obviously  a  treaty  of  that  kind  (/.  c,  where  the  two 
parties  must  agree  upon  such  matters)  might  be  made,  and 
that,  being  made,  it  would  be  necessary  that  the  two  Gov- 
ernments should  be  in  such  agreement  upon  the  time,  the 
occasion,  and  the  manner  of  intervention  as  the  treaty  might 
contemplate.  But  the  treaty  under  discussion  is  not  such  a 
treaty,  for  the  reason,  in  the  first  place,  that,  as  already 
pointed  out,  it  does  not  grant  rights  of  intervention,  but 
recognizes  and  consents  to  their  exercise;  that  it  uses  the 
term  "intervene"  without  qualification  and  therefore  in  its 
general,  unrestricted,  international  law  sense;  and  that  it  does 
not  attempt  to  define  either  the  time,  the  occasion,  or  the 
manner  of  intervention,  but  merely  states  the  purposes  to 
accomplish  which  Cuba  has  given  an  anticipatory  consent  for 
intervention.  In  other  words,  the  treaty  uses  the  term 
"intervene"  without  any  restriction  whatsoever  and  without 
any  attempted  definition  save  as  to  the  purposes  of  interven- 
tion, thus  leaving  the  term  "intervene"  in  every  other  respect 


lO 


to   be  interpreted   in   accordance  with   its  international  law 


meanmg. 


Now,  regarding  the  import  and  effect  of  the  treaty  state- 
ment regarding  the  purposes  of  intervention,  as  already 
pointed  out,  since  the  h-eaty  does  not  create,  but  merely 
recognizes,  the  right  of  this  Government  to  intervene;  and 
since  the  rights  which  this  Government  has  are  predicated, 
first,  upon  the  fact,  as  pointed  out  by  President  Mc- 
Kinley  in  iiis  message  of  December  15,  1899,  that  "this 
nation  has  assumed  before  the  world  a  grave  responsibility 
for  the  future  good  government  of  Cuba"  (p.  2,  supra)  ;  sec- 
ondly, upon  the  fact  that,  as  the  Secretary  of  War  said,  "'for 
our  ozuji protection,  ive  have,  by  reason  of  expelling  Spain  from 
Cuba,  become  the  giLarantors  of  Cuban  independence  and  the 
guarantors  oj  a  stable  and  orderly  government  protecting  life 
and  property  in  that  island''  (p.  3,  supra);  and,  thirdly,  upon 
the  fact  that  we  are  under  certain  treaty  obligations  to  Spain 
with  reference  to  the  Cuban  Republic  (see  p.  8,  supra) — it 
becomes  obvious  that,  in  view  of  these  interests  and  obliga- 
tions, which  latter  impose  upon  us  responsibilities  as  toward 
third  powers,  this  Government  must,  in  order  properly  to 
protect  its  interests,  as  well  as  adequately  to  meet  such 
responsibilities,  determine  for  itself  when  such  interests  are 
impaired  as  well  as  when  such  responsibilities  arise,  as  it  must 
also  determine  for  itself  when  its  interests  are  threatened  or 
its  responsibility  likely  to  be  invoked.  In  no  other  way 
could  the  rights  recognized,  /;///  7iot  created,  by  the  treaty  be 
effectively  enjoyed,  because  if  it  were  necessary  for  the  two 
Governments  to  come  to  an  agreement  either  as  to  the  im- 
pairment or  as  to  the  threatened  impairment  of  our  interests, 
and  the  same  as  to  our  responsibilities  toward  other  nations, 
this  Government  might  find  that  the  rights  recognized  and 
the  treaty  stipulations  themselves  might  and  probably  would 
become  of  no  force  and  effect  by  reason  of  the  disposition 
of  Cuban  officials  to  postpone  the  exercise  of  the  rights 
until  the  evils  which  were  intended  to  be  avoided  were 
fully  upon  this  Government.  The  treaty  should  not 
be    so    interpreted   as   practically   to    nullify   its    provisions. 


1  I 


Or,  to  look  at  the  matter  from  a  slightly  different  angle, 
the  treaty  purports  to  do  nothing  more  than  to  set  forth 
the  purposes  for  which  intervention  should  take  j)lace,  leav- 
ing all  else  untouched,  and,  therefore,  while  it  might  he 
argued  that  this  Government  could  not  intervene  in  Cuba 
for  any  other  piLrpose  than  that  mentioned  in  the  treaty, 
save  bv  an  agreement  with  Cuba,  vet  that  is  the  utmost  that 
could  be  properly  contended,  for  the  reason  that  the  treaty 
stipulation  being  solely  as  to  \\\q  purpose  of  intervention,  the 
only  question  that  could  arise  under  the  treaty  would  be  as 
to  that  purpose.  Therefore,  the  only  question  in  which 
Cuba  could  under  any  theory  have  a  right  to  a  voice  or 
expression  of  opinion  would  be  as  to  whether  the  particular 
purpose  of  intervention  under  discussion  in  any  given  case 
fell  within  the  treaty  provisions.  But  when  this  Govern- 
ment intervenes  avowedly  for  one  of  i\\e  purposes  named  in 
the  treaty,  Cuba  has  absolutely  nothing  to  say,  under  the 
treaty,  unless  it  is  prepared  to  contest  the  bona  fides  of  our 
statement  of  purpose — that  is,  unless  it  is  in  a  position  to 
say  that  our  intervention  is  not  for  any  of  the  purposes 
named  in  the  convention,  but  for  some  other  purpose  out- 
side and  beyond  the  convention. 

It  therefore  naturally  follows  from  these  principles  that 
the  Government  of  the  United  States  must  determine  in 
every  case  the  time,  the  occasion,  and  the  manner  of  inter- 
vention by  it  in  Cuba,  and  that  in  this  matter  it  is  wholly 
uncontrolled  save  by  its  own  interests  and  iis  national 
conscience. 

Applving  the  principles  above  set  forth  to  the  existing 
state  in  Cuba,  with  reference  to  its  financial  policy  and  con- 
ditions, it  would  result  that,  if  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  is  convinced  that  such  j)olicy  and  conditions  are  not 
such  as  will  insure  the  "maintenance  of  a  government  ade- 
quate for  the  protection  of  life,  property,  and  individual 
libertv"  in  Cuba,  or  that  such  policv  and  condition  threaten 
the  independence  of  Cuba,  or  that  ihcy  make  impossible  the 
discharge  bv  Cuba  of  the  obligations  imposed  by  the  Treaty 
of  Paris,  then  this  Government  has  the  right  to  intervene  in 


12 

such  form  as  it  may  see  fit,  either  by  pacific  means  or  by 
miHtary  measures,  in  order  that  any  of  the  purposes  named 
may  be  accomplished. 

Interference  by  one  or  more  powers  in  the  fiscal  affairs 
of  other  powers,  in  and  through  pacific  measures  (though 
obviously  and  of  course  with  the  sanction  behind  such 
measures  of  a  force  necessary  to  make  such  intervention 
effective)  is  well  recognized  in  international  law.  Bonfils,  in 
his  De  Droit  International  Public,  has  the  following  discus- 
sion on  this  point : 

"The  case  of  foreign  creditors  of  a  state  claiming  protection 
of  their  government  to  obtain  payment  of  their  credits,  was  fre- 
quently realized  in  the  Nineteenth  Century — the  century  of 
international  loans  (Greece,  Turkey,  Egypt,  Servia,  Portugal, 
&c.)  In  pure  theory,  a"  state  is  not  authorized  to  constrain 
another  state  to  the  payment  of  this  kind  of  debts.  Lord  Palm- 
erston  very  justly  said  in  a  despatch  of  January  1848:  To  con- 
fide one's  capital  to  foreign  go'Cernments,  to  subscribe  to  a  loan 
opened  by  a  foreign  state,  is  to  make  a  financial  speculation. 
The  risk  inherent  in  all  operations  of  this  kind  is  also  found  in 
subscriptions  to  a  government  loan.  The  lenders  should  fore- 
see the  eventuality  of  the  insolvency  of  a  state  as  of  a  simple 
individual. 

"  In  fact,  European  governments  have  intervened  in  favor 
of  their  national  creditors  with  weak  states  incapable  of  resist- 
ing, but  not  with  strong  states  who  will  not  permit  any  inter- 
vention whatever  between  them  and  their  creditors. 

"An  example  distinguishing  intervention  to  protect  the 
pecuniary  interests  of  nationals,  is  offered  in  the  European  con- 
trol established  in  Egypt  in  1876 — a  control  provoked  by  the 
detestable  financial  administration  of  the  Khedive — a  control 
confided  to  two  functionaries,  one  English,  the  other  French. 
A  Khedival  decree  of  January  27,  1878,  established  a  commis- 
sion of  international  investigation.  The  Ministry  of  Finance 
was  given  to  an  Englishman  ;  that  of  Public  Works,  to  a  French- 
man. The  Khedive  sought  to  rid  himself  of  ftjreigners  by  pro- 
voking a  national  movement.  Upon  protest  of  the  powers,  and 
notably  of  England  and  France,  Ismail  Pacha  was  deposed  by 
the  Sultan  in  June,  1879.  The  new  khedive  named  a  commis- 
sion of  liquidation  composed  of  representatives  of  Germany, 
England,  Austria,  France,  and  Italy.  This  commission  prepared 
the  law  of  liquidation  of  March  31,  1880.      After  the  English 


13 

« 

occupation  of  1882  a  new  loan  was  necessary;  it  was  guaranteed 
l)y  the  ptjwers,  who  took  a  decisive  influence  in  financial  mat- 
ters. It  was  issued  July  30,  1885.  The  European  powers  inter- 
vened again  in  1890  and  authorized  the  conversion  of  the 
privileged  debt. 

"The  financial vcontrol  of  foreign  powers  was  established  in 
Tunis  in  1869.  By  agreement  with  the  Bey  of  Tunis,  England, 
France,  Italy,  instituted  a  financial  commission  at  the  head  of 
which  was  placed  a  French  Inspector  General  of  Finance.  Since 
then  France  has  established  a  protectorate  and  the  law  of  Feb- 
ruary 9,  1889,  has  converted  the  Tunisian  debt,  in  bonds  redeem- 
able in  ninety-nine  years  and  guaranteed  by  France. 

"After  the  war  of  1897  between  Greece  and  Turkey,  the 
great  powers  determined  to  establish  a  control  over  Hellenic 
finances,  partly  with  the  object  of  assuring  the  protection  of 
their  nationals,  holders  of  Greek  bonds. 

"Intervention  in  favor  of  nationals,  creditors  of  a  foreign 
state,  besides  striking  at  the  right  of  independence,  are  dan- 
gerous in  their  consequences.  They  excite  the  resentment  of 
the  people  against  foreigners,  tliey  complicate  international 
relations." 

The  custom  of  nations  thus  recognizes,  as  one  mode  of 
intervention,  interference  with  the  fiscal  affairs  of  another 
state,  even  though  such  interference  has  received  the  ani- 
madversion of  certain  international  hiw  writers.  Being  a 
recognized  type  of  intervention,  and  irrespective  of  its  pro- 
priety or  impropriety  as  discussed  by  theoretical  writers, 
interference  in  the  fiscal  affairs  of  Cuba  falls  within  the 
intervention  to  which  Cuba  has  given  lier  consent  in  the 
treaty.  The  Government  of  the  United  States  may  there- 
fore exercise  such  measures  of  interference  or  intervention  in 
the  fiscal  affairs  of  Cuba  b\-  pacific  or  military  means  as  in 
the  judgment  of  tiiis  Government  is  necessary  in  order  to 
accomplish  the  purposes  indicated  in  the  treaty,  and  this 
Government  must  be  the  judge  of  the  character  and  extent 
of  such  measures. 

Attached  hereto  is  a  nuMiiorandum  collecting  togcilicr 
the  various  statements  and  expressions  of  governmental 
ofificers  from  which  ma\-  be  gatiiered  suggestions  as  to  the 
meaniuLr  of  the  term  "  intervene  ". 


THE  PLATT  AMENDMENT. 


Interpretation  of  Article  III  in  Connection  with  the  Matter  of  this 
Government's  Right  of  Protest  or  Control  in  Cases  of  Financial 
Maladministration  in  Cuba. 


Article  III  of  the  Treaty  of  Relations  of  1903  between 
this  Government  and  Cuba,  which  embodied  Article  III  of 
the  Piatt  Amendment,  reads: 

"The  Government  of  Cuba  consents  that  the  United  States 
mav  exercise  the  right  to  intervene  for  the  preservation  of  Cuban 
independence,  the  maintenance  of  a  government  adequate  for 
the  protection  of  life,  property,  and  individual  liberty,  and 
for  discharging  the  obligations  with  respect  to  Cuba  imposed 
by  the  Treaty  of  Paris  on  the  United  States,  now  to  be  assumed 
and  undertaken  by  the  Government  of  Cuba." 

The  question  arises  whether  "intervention"  in  this 
article  means  only  actual  occupation  of  Cuban  territory  by 
American  forces  or  whether  it  has  also  the  broader  mcaninfr 
of  "intervention"  as  employed  in  international  law.  whicli 
comprehends  the  giving  of  advice  or  the  making  of  demands 
or  requests  by  diplomatic  representation. 

The  object  of  this  memorandum  is  to  summarize  the 
results  of  an  investigation  of  possible  sources  of  interpreta- 
tion of  this  article  found  in  the  events  connectetl  with  the 
adoption  of  the  amendment  by  the  Congress  of  the  United 
States  and  by  the  Cuban  Constitutional  Convention  and  in 
the  opening  events  of  the  Second  Intervention. 

DEBATES    IN    CONGRESS. 

The  Piatt  Amendment,  an  amendment  to  the  Army  Ajv 
propriation  Bill  of  1901.  was  submitted  to  the  Senate  on 
February  25,  1901,  adopted  by  that  body  on  February  27,  and 

15 


i6 

concurred  in   bv  the  House  of  Representatives  on  March  i. 
It  reads  as  follows : 

'''' Provided  further,  Tliat  in  fultillment  of  tlie  declaration  con- 
tained in  the  joint  resolution  approved  April  20,  1898,  entitled 
'For  the  recognition  of  the  independence  of  the  people  of 
Cuba,  demanding  that  the  Government  of  Spain  relinquish  its 
authority  and  government  in  the  island  of  Cuba,  and  to  with- 
draw its  land  and  naval  forces  from  Cuba  and  Cuban  waters, 
and  directing  the  President  of  the  United  States  to  use  the 
land  and  naval  forces  of  the  United  States  to  carry  these  reso- 
tions  into  effect,'  the  President  is  hereby  authorized  to  'leave 
the  government  and  control  of  the  island  of  Cuba  to  its  people' 
so  soon  as  a  government  shall  have  been  established  in  said 
island  under  a  constitution  which,  either  as  a  part  thereof  or 
in  an  ordinance  appended  thereto,  shall  define  the  future  rela- 
tions of  the  United  States  with  Cuba,  substantially  as  follows: 

"I. 

"That  the  government  of  Cuba  shall  never  enter  into  any 
treat}'  or  other  compact  with  any  foreign  power  or  powers 
which  will  impair  or  tend  to  impair  the  independence  of  Cuba, 
nor  in  any  manner  authorize  or  permit  any  foreign  power  or 
powers  to  obtain  by  colonization  or  for  military  or  naval  pur- 
poses or  otherwise,  lodgment  in  or  control  over  any  portion  of 
said  island. 

"ii. 

"The  said  government  shall  not  assume  or  contract  any 
public  debt,  to  pay  the  interest  upon  which,  and  to  make  rea- 
sonable sinking  fund  provision  for  the  ultimate  discharge  of 
which,  the  ordinary  revenues  of  the  island,  after  defraying  the 
current  expenses  of  government,  shall  be  inadequate. 

"III. 

"That  the  government  of  Cuba  consents  that  the  United 
States  may  exercise  the  right  to  intervene  for  the  preservation 
of  Cuban  independence,  the  maintenance  of  a  government  ade- 
quate for  the  protection  of  life,  property,  and  individual  liberty, 
and  for  discharging  the  obligations  with  respect  to  Cuba 
imposed  by  the  treaty  of  Paris  on  the  United  States,  now  to  be 
assumed  and  undertaken  by  the  government  of  Cuba. 


'7 


"W. 


"That  all  acts  of  the  United  States  in  Cuba  durinj^  its 
military  occupancy  thereof  are  ratified  and  validated,  and  all 
lawful  rights  acquired  thereundt^r  shall  l)c  maintained  and 
protected. 

"V. 

"That  the  government  of  Cuba  will  execute,  and  as  far  as 
necessary  extend,  the  plans  already  devised  or  other  plans  to 
be  mutually  agreed  upon,  for  the  sanitation  of  the  cities  of  the 
island,  to  the  end  that  a  recurrence  of  epidemic  and  infectious 
diseases  may  be  prevented,  thereby  assuring  protection  to  the 
people  and  commerce  of  Cuba,  as  well  as  to  the  commerce  of 
the  Southern  ports  of  the  United  States  and  the  people  residing 
therein. 

"VI. 

"That  tlie  Isle  oi  Pines  shall  be  omitted  from  the  proposed 
constitutional  boundaries  of  Cuba,  the  title  thereto  being  left 
to  future  adjustment  by  treaty. 

"VII. 

"  That  to  enable  the  United  States  to  maintain  the  inde- 
pendence of  Cuba,  and  to  protect  the  people  thereof,  as  well  as 
for  its  own  defense,  the  government  of  Cuba  will  sell  or  lease 
to  the  United  States  lands  necessary  for  coaling  or  naval  stations 
at  certain  specified  points,  to  be  agreed  upon  with  the  President 
of  the  United  States. 

"VIII. 

"That  by  way  of  further  assurance  the  government  of  Cuba 
will  embody  the  foregoing  provisions  in  a  permanent  treaty  with 
the  United  States." 

As  appears  from  its  text,  the  Flatt  Amendment  pro- 
vided, as  a  condition  precedent  to  the  withdrawal  of  the 
American  forces  of  occupation,  tliat  Cuba  should  adopt  as  a 
part  of  its  constitution,  then  in  the  making,  tiic  provisions 
set  forth  in  the  amendment  in  regard  to  the  future  relations 
between  this  Government  and  Cuba.  These  provisions,  as 
above  indicated,  were,  subsequent  to  their  adoption  as  a  part 
of  the  Cuban  Constitution,  embodied  in  a  treaty  of  relations 
between  this  Government  and  Cuba  in  the  year  1903. 


i8 

The  amendment  was  introduced,  as  indicated  above,  at 
the  close  of  the  session  of  Congress,  and  the  debate  on  its 
provisions,  both  in  the  Senate  and  in  the  House,  was  neces- 
sarily limited.  The  report  of  the  final  discussion  in  the 
Senate  is  contained  at  pages  3145  to  3149  of  volume  34, 
part  4,  of  the  Congressional  Record,  The  final  discussion 
in  the  House  appears  at  pages  3338-3384  of  the  same  vol- 
ume. The  principal  objection  to  the  amendment  on  the 
part  of  the  Democratic  minority  seems  to  have  been  that  it 
provided  for  a  form  of  })rotectorate  or  suzerainty  over  Cuba 
and  consequently  was  a  violation  of  the  promise  of  the 
United  States  contained  in  the  final  part  of  the  resolution  of 
April  20,  1898,  adopted  as  a  preliminary  to  the  war  with 
Spain.     The  part  of  the  resolution  in  question  reads: 

"The  United  States  hereby  disclaims  any  disposition  or 
intention  to  exercise  sovereignty,  jurisdiction,  or  control  over 
said  island  [Cuba],  except  for  the  pacification  thereof,  and 
asserts  its  determination,  when  that  is  accomplished,  to  leave 
the  government  and  control  of  the  island  to  its  people." 

The  principal  arguments  in  favor  of  the  amendment 
made  by  the  Republican  majority  seem  to  have  been  that 
its  provisions  were  necessary,  first,  in  order  to  make  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  effective  with  respect  to  Cuba,  and  secondly, 
to  insure  the  performance  of  this  Government's  moral  obliga- 
tions under  the  Treaty  of  Paris. 

Nowhere  in  the  debates  does  there  appear  to  be  a  dis- 
cussion of  the  meaning  of  "intervention"  in  the  aspect 
now  under  consideration,  namely,  its  possible  meaning  of 
interference  in  Cuban  affairs  through  diplomatic  representa- 
tion. In  the  record,  however,  there  is  a  considerable  amount 
of  discussion  indicating  that  in  the  references  in  the  debate 
to  intervention  the  legislators  had  in  mind  actual  occupation 
of  Cuban  territory.  The  force  of  this,  however,  would  seem 
to  be  minimized  by  the  fact  that  the  question  now  under 
consideration  seems  never  to  have  been  definitely  raised. 


19 

ADOPTION     OF     THE     AMENDMENT     BY    THE     CUHAN     CONSTITU- 
TIONAL   CONVENTION. 

The  followiiifr  data  has  been  taken  i^rinci|:)allv  from  a 
book  entitled  "Cuba  and  the  Interveniiuii "  (Long-mans, 
Green  c\.  Co.,  New  York,  1905),  by  Albert  G.  Robinson,  a 
newspaper  correspondent,  who  appears  to  have  been  in  Cuba 
for  considerable  periods  of  time  during  the  events  described 
in  his  book. 

As  a  result  of  several  orders  issued  by  the  executive 
authorities  of  the  iVmerican  Provisional  Government  a  con- 
vention, called  for  the  purpose  of  adopting  a  Cuban  Consti- 
tution, mot  in  Habana  in  the  early  part  of  1900.  The 
convention  was  to  adopt  a  constitution  for  Cuba  and  to  pro- 
vide what  should  be  the  future  relations  between  Cuba  and 
the  United  States. 

Subsequent  to  the  framing  of  the  constitution  proper 
Secretary  of  War  Root  addressed  to  General  Wood,  Militarv 
Governor  of  Cuba,  the  following  letter: 

"War  Department, 
' '  Washington,  February  p,  igoi. 
"Sir:  As  the  time  approaches  for  the  Cuban  constitutional 
convention  to  consider  and  act  upon  Cuba's  relations  uitli  the 
United  States,  it  seems  desirable  that  you  should  be  informed 
of  the  views  of  the  Executive  Department  of  our  Government 
upon  that  subject  in  a  more  official  form  than  that  in  which 
they  have  been  communicated  to  you  hitherto.  The  limitations 
upon  the  power  of  the  Executive  by  the  resolution  of  Congress 
of  April  20,  1898,  are  such  that  the  final  determination  upon  the 
whole  subject  may  ultimately  rest  in  Congress,  and  it  is  imprac- 
ticable now  to  forecast  what  the  action  of  Congress  will  be.  In 
the  meantime,  until  Congress  shall  have  acted,  the  military 
branch  of  the  Government  is  bound  to  refrain  from  any  com- 
mittal, or  apparent  committal,  of  the  United  States  to  any  policy 
which  should  properly  be  determined  upon  by  Congress,  and,  at 
the  same  time,  so  far  as  it  is  called  upon  to  act  or  to  make  sug- 
gestions bearing  upon  the  course  of  events,  it  must  determine 
its  own  conduct  by  reference  to  the  action  already  taken  by 
Congress,  the  established  policy  of  the  United  States,  the  objects 
of  our  present  occupation,  and  the  manifest  interests  of  the  two 
countries. 


20 

"The  jtjini  resoluiion  of  Congress  of  April  20,  1898,  which 
authorized  the  President  to  expel  the  Spanish  forces  from  Cuba, 
declared — 

"'that  the  United  States  hereby  disclaims  any  disposition  or 
intention  to  exercise  sovereignty,  jurisdiction,  or  control  over 
said  island  except  for  the  pacification  thereof,  and  asserts  its 
determination,  when  that  is  accomplished,  to  leave  the  govern- 
ment and  the  control  of  the  island  to  its  people.' 

"The  treaty  of  peace  concluded  at  Paris  on  the  loth  of 
December,  189S,  and  ratified  by  the  Senate  on  the  6th  of  Feb- 
ruary,  1899,  provides  in  the  first  article  that — 

"  'as  the  island  is,  upon  its  evacuation  by  Spain,  to  be  occupied 
by  the  United  States,  the  United  States  will,  so  long  as  such 
occupation  shall  last,  assume  and  discharge  the  obligations 
that  may,  under  international  law,  result  from  the  fact  of  its 
occupation,  for  the  protection  of  life  and  property.' 

"  I,t  contains  numerous  obligations  on  the  part  of  the  United 
States  in  respect  of  the  treatment  of  the  inhabitants  of  the 
territory  relinquished  by  Spain,  such  as  the  provision  of  the 
tenth  article,  that  the  inhabitants  shall  be  secured  in  the  free 
exercise  of  their  religion;  of  the  eleventh  article,  that  they 
shall  be  subject  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  courts,  pursuant  to 
the  ordinary  laws  governing  the  same,  and  of  the  ninth  article, 
that  they  shall  retain  all  their  rights  of  property,  including  the 
right  to  sell  or  dispose  thereof,  and  the  right  to  carry  on  their 
industry,  commerce,  and  professions.  The  sixteenth  article  of 
the  treaty  provides  that  the  obligations  assumed  in  the  treaty 
by  the  United  States  with  respect  to  Cuba  are  limited  to  the 
time  of  its  occupancy  thereof,  but  that  it  shall,  upon  the  termi- 
nation of  such  occupancy,  advise  any  government  established 
in  the  island  to  assume  the  same  obligations. 

"Our  occupation  of  Cuba  has  been  under  the  binding 
force  both  of  the  resolution  and  of  the  treat}',  and  the  pacifica- 
tion mentioned  in  the  resolution  has  necessarily  been  construed 
as  coextensive  with  the  occupation  provided  for  by  the  treaty, 
during  which  we  were  to  discharge  international  obligations, 
protect  the  rights  of  the  former  subjects  of  Spain,  and  cause  or 
permit  the  establishment  of  a  government  to  which  we  could, 
in  good  faith,  commit  the  protection  of  the  lives  and  property 
and  personal  rights  of  those  inhabitants  from  whom  we  had 
compelled  their  former  sovereign  to  withdraw  her  protection. 
//  IS  plain  that  the  goverfii/ie/it  to  ivhich  we  were  thus  to  transfer  our 
temporary  obligations  should  be  a* government  based  upon  the  peaceful 
suffrages  of  the  people  of  Cuba,  representing  the  entire  people  and  hold- 


21 

ing  their  power  from  the  people^  and  subject  to  the  limitations  and  safe- 
guards which  the  experience  of  constitutional  government  has  shown  to 
be  necessary  to  the  preservation  of  individual  rights.  This  is  plain  as 
a  duty  to  the  people  of  Cuba  under  the  resolution  of  April  20, 
1898,  and  it  is  plain  as  an  obligation  of  good  faith  under  the 
treaty  of  Paris.  Such  a  government  we  have  been  persistently 
and  with  all  practicable  speed  building  up  in  Cuba,  and  we 
hope  to  see  it  established  and  assume  control  under  the  pro- 
visions which  shall  be  adopted  by  the  present  convention.  It 
seems  to  me  that  no  one  familiar  with  the  traditional  and  estab- 
lished policy  of  this  country  in  respect  to  Cuba  can  find  cause 
for  doubt  as  to  our  remaining  duty.  It  would  be  hard  to  find 
any  single  statement  of  public  policy  which  has  been  so  often 
officially  declared  by  so  great  an  array  of  distinguished  Ameri- 
cans authorized  to  speak  for  the  Government  of  the  United 
States,  as  the  proposition  stated,  in  varying  but  always  uncom- 
promising and  unmistakable  terms,  that  the  United  States  would 
not  under  any  circumstances  permit  any  foreign  power  other 
than  Spain  to  acquire  possession  of  the  island  of  Cuba. 

"Jefferson  and  Monroe  and  John  Quincy  Adams  and  Jackson 
and  Van  Buren  and  Grant  and  Clay  and  Webster  and  Buchanan 
and  Everett  have  all  agreed  in  regarding  this  as  essential  to  the 
interests  and  the  protection  of  the  United  States.  The  United 
States  has,  and  will  always  have,  the  most  vital  interest  in  the  preser- 
vation of  the  independe?ice  which  she  has  secured  for  Cuba,  and  in  pre- 
serving the  people  of  that  island  from  the  domination  and  control  of  any 
foreign  power  ^vhatever.  The  preservation  of  that  independence  by  a 
country  so  small  as  Cuba,  so  incapable,  as  she  must  always  be,  to  contend 
by  force  against  the  great  po^uers  of  the  world,  must  depend  upon  her 
strict  performance  of  international  obligatiofis,  upon  her  giving  due 
protection  to  the  lives  and  property  of  the  citizens  of  all  other  countries 
within  her  borders,  and  upon  her  never  contracting  any  public  debt 
which  in  the  hands  of  the  citizens  of  foreign  pozcers  shall  constitute  an 
obligation  she  is  unable  to  meet.  The  United  States  has,  therefore, 
not  merely  a  moral  obligation  arising  from  her  destruction  of  Spanish 
authority  in  Cuba  and  the  obligations  of  the  treaty  of  Paris  for  the 
establishment  of  a  stable  and  adequate  government  in  Cuba,  but  it  has 
a  substantial  interest  in  the  maintenance  of  such  a  governmetit. 

* '  We  arc  placed  in  a  position  where,  for  our  own  protection,  we 
have,  by  reason  of  expelling  Spain  from  Cuba,  become  the  guarantors 
of  Cuban  independence  and  the  guarantors  of  a  stable  and  orderly  gov- 
ernment protecting  life  and  property  in  that  island.  Fortunately  the 
condition  which  we  deem  essential  for  our  own  interests  is  the 
condition  for  which  Cuba  has  been   struggling,  and  whicli   the 


oo 


duty  we  have  assumed  toward  Cuba  on  Cuban  grounds  and  for 
Cuban  interests  requires.  It  would  be  a  most  lame  and  impo- 
tent conclusion  if,  after  all  the  expenditure  of  blood  and  treas- 
ure bv  the  people  of  the  United  States  for  the  freedom  of  Cuba 
and  by  the  people  of  Cuba  for  the  same  object,  we  should, 
through  tlie  constitution  of  the  new  government,  by  inadvert- 
ence or  otherwise,  be  placed  in  a  worse  condition  in  regard  to 
our  own  vital  interests  than  we  were  while  Spain  was  in  posses- 
sion, and  the  people  of  Cuba  should  be  deprived  of  that  protec- 
tion and  aid  from  the  United  States  which  is  necessary  to  the 
maintenance  of  their  independence.  It  was,  undoubtedly,  in 
consideration  of  these  special  relations  between  the  United 
States  and  Cuba  that  the  president  said  in  his  message  to  Con- 
gress of  the  nth  of  April,  1898: 

"  'The  only  hope  of  relief  and  repose  from  a  condition  which 
can  no  longer  be  endured  is  the  enforced  pacification  of  Cuba. 
In  the  name  of  humanity,  in  the  name  of  civilization,  in  behalf 
of  endangered  American  interests  which  give  us  the  right  and 
the  duty  to  speak  and  to  act,  the  war  in  Cuba  must  stop. 

"  'In  view  of  these  facts  and  of  these  considerations  I  ask 
the  Congress  to  authorize  and  empower  the  President  to  take 
measures  to  secure  a  full  and  final  termination  of  hostilities 
between  the  Government  of  Spain  and  the  people  of  Cuba,  and 
to  secure  in  the  island  the  establishment  of  a  stable  government, 
capable  of  maintaining  order  and  observing  its  international 
obligations,  insuring  peace  and  tranquillity  and  the  security  of 
its  citizens  as  well  as  our  own,  and  to  use  the  military  and  naval 
forces  of  the  United  States  as  may  be  necessary  for  these  pur- 
poses.' 

"And  in  his  message  of  December  5,  1899: 

"  'This  nation  has  assumed  before  the  world  a  grave  respon- 
sibility for  the  future  good  government  of  Cuba.  We  have 
accepted  a  trust,  the  fulfillment  of.  which  calls  for  the  sternest 
integrity  of  purpose  and  the  exercise  of  the  highest  wisdom. 
The  new  Cuba  yet  to  arise  from  the  ashes  of  the  past  must 
needs  be  bound  to-  us  by  ties  of  singular  intimacy  and  strength 
if  its  enduring  welfare  is  to  be  assured.  Whether  those  ties 
shall  be  organic  or  conventional,  the  destinies  of  Cuba  are  in 
some  rightful  form  and  manner  irrevocably  linked  with  our 
own,  but  how  and  how  far  is  for  the  future  to  determine  in 
the  ripeness  of  events.  Whatever  be  the  outcome,  we  must  see 
to  it  that  free  Cuba  be  a  reality,  not  a  name,  a  perfect  entity, 
not  a  hasty  experiment  bearing  within  itself  the  elements  of 
failure.  Our  mission,  to  accomplish  which  we  took  up  the 
wager  of  battle,  is  not  to  be  fulfilled  by  turning  adrift  any 
loosely  framed  commonwealth  to  face  the  vicissitudes  which 
too    often    attend    weaker    states    whose     natural   wealth     and 


23 

abundant  resources  are  offset  by  the  incongruities  of  their 
political  organization  and  the  recurring  occasions  for  internal 
rivalries  to  sap  their  strength  and  dissipate  their  energies.' 

"And  it  was  with  a  view  to  the  proper  settlement  and  dis- 
position of  these  necessar}!  relations  that  the  order  for  the 
election  of  delegates  to  the  present  constitutional  convention 
provided  that  they  should  frame  and  adopt  a  constitution  for 
the  people  of  Cuba,  and  as  a  part  thereof  provide  for  and 
agree  with  the  Government  of  the  United  States  upon  the  rela- 
tions to  exist  between  that  Government  and  the  government  of 
Cuba. 

''The  people  of  Cuba  should  desire  to  have  incorporated  in 
her  fundamental  law  provisions  in  substance  as  follows: 

"  I.  That  no  government  organized  under  the  constitution 
shall  be  deemed  to  have  authority  to  enter  into  any  treaty  or 
engagement  with  any  foreign  power  which  may  tend  to  impair 
or  interfere  with  the  independence  of  Cuba,  or  to  confer  upon 
such  foreign  power  any  special  right  or  privilege  without  the 
consent  of  the  United  States. 

"2.  That  no  government  organized  under  the  constitution 
shall  have  authority  to  assume  or  contract  any  public  debt  in 
excess  of  the  capacity  of  the  ordinary  revenues  of  the  island 
after  defraying  the  current  expenses  of  government  to  pay  the 
interest. 

"3.  That  upon  the  transfer  of  the  control  of  Cuba  to  the 
government  established  under  the  new  constitution  Cuba  con- 
sents that  the  United  States  reserve  and  retain  the  right  of 
intervention  for  the  preservation  of  Cuban  independence  and 
the  maintenance  of  a  stable  government,  adequately  protecting 
life,  property,  and  individual  liberty,  and  discharging  the  obli- 
gations with  respect  to  Cuba  imposed  by  the  treaty  of  Paris  on 
the  United  States  and  now  assumed  and  undertaken  by  the 
government  of  Cuba. 

"4.  That  all  the  acts  of  the  military  government,  and  all 
rights  acquired  thereunder,  shall  be  valid  and  shall  be  main- 
tained and  protected. 

"5.  That  to  facilitate  the  United  States  in  the  performance 
of  such  duties  as  may  devolve  upon  her  under  the  foregoing 
provisions  and  for  her  own  defense,  the  United  States  may 
acquire  and  hold  the  title  to  land  for  naval  stations,  and  main- 
tain the  same  at  certain  specified  points. 

"These  provisions  may  not,  it  is  true,  prove  to  be  in  accord 
with  the  conclusions  which  Congress  maj'  ultimately  reach  when 
that  body  comes  to  consider  the  subject,  but  as,  until  Congress 


24 

has  acted,  the  Executive  must  necessarily  witliin  its  own  sphere 
of  action  be  controlled  bj'  its  own  judgment,  you  should  now 
be  guided  by  the  views  above  expressed. 

"  It  is  not  our  purpose  at  this  time  to  discuss  the  cost  of  our 
intervention  and  occupation,  or  advancement  of  money  for  dis- 
armament, or  our  assumption  under  the  treaty  of  Paris  of  the 
claims  of  our  citizens  against  Spain  for  losses  which  they  had 
incurred  in  Cuba.  These  can  well  be  the  subject  of  later  con- 
sideration. 

"  \^ery  respectfully, 

•'  Ei.iHU   Root, 

'"''Secretary  of  War. 
"Maj.  Gen.  Leonard  Wood, 

'"'' Military  Governor  of  Cuba., 

'''' Habana,  Cuba." 

It  will  be  noticed  that  shortly  after  the  receipt  of  this 
letter  the  Piatt  Amendment,  which  had  been  foreshadowed 
by  it,  was  passed  by  the  American  Congress.  There  appears 
to  have  been  considerable  opposition  to  the  amendment  in 
Cuba  and  uncertainty  as  to  the  precise  effect  of  Article  III. 

Under  date  of  April  3,  1901,  the  following  official  state- 
ment of  the  meaning  of  Article  III  was  made  by  the  Secre- 
tary of  War : 

"Wood,  Habana. 

"You  are  authorized  to  state  officially  that  in  the  view  of 
the  President  the  intervention  described  in  the  third  clause  of 
the  Piatt  amendment  is  not  synonymous  with  intermeddling  or 
interference  with  the  affairs  of  the  Cuban  government,  but  the 
formal  action  of  the  Government  of  the  United  States,  based 
upon  just  and  substantial  grounds,  for  the  preservation  of  Cuban 
independence,  and  the  maintenance  of  a  government  adequate 
for  the  protection  of  life,  property,  and  individual  liberty,  and 
adequate  for  discharging  the  obligations  with  respect  to  Cuba 
imposed  by  the  treaty  of  Paris  on  the  United  States. 

"Elihu   Root,  Secretary  of  War.'' 

On  pages  263  to  276  of  Robinson  appears  an  account  of 
the  final  steps  in  the  adoption  of  the  amendment  by  the 
Cuban  convention.  This,  in  summary,  is  as  follows:  Sug- 
gestion was  made  in  the  convention  that  a  commission  be 
sent  to  Washington  to  confer  with  the  administration  con- 
cerning the  interpretation  of  the  amendment  and  its  finality. 


25 

A  commission  was  appointed,  came  to  Washington,  and  on 
April  25,  1901,  after  a  call  on  the  President,  engaged  in  a 
conference  with  Secretary  Root.  This  conference  was  secret 
and  the  details  have  never  been  made  public.  The  commis- 
sion took  away  with  them  on  their  return  to  Cuba  an  analysis 
of  the  measure  as  interi)reted  by  Secretary  Root,  but  were 
gi\'cn  to  understand  that  the  ultimatum  of  the  Piatt  Amend- 
ment was  a  decision  in  which  there  could  be  no  change  and 
from  which  there  could  be  no  withdrawal.  On  the  2<Sth  of 
May  the  amfiidmcnt  was  adopted  bv  the  con\ention  bv  a 
vote  of  I  5  to  14.  'Ihe  majority  report  uj)on  which  the  vote 
was  taken,  after  quoting  Article  I  of  the  Treaty  of  Paris,  the 
joint  resolution  of  April  20,  1898,  and  the  terms  of  the  Piatt 
Amendment,  proceeded  with  the  following  explanations: 

'  ''Inasmuch  as  Secretary  Root,  being  authorized  by  President  Mc- 
Kinley^  says  that  'the  Piatt  la^v  has  for  its  object  the  guaranteeing  of 
the  independence  of  Cuba,  and  does  not  mean  interference  with  its  gov- 
ernment, or  the  exercise  of  a  protectorate  or  of  sovereignty,  and  also 
that  intervention  will  only  take  place  wheti  independence  is  endangered 
by  outside  potvers  or  grave  interior  disturbances  creating  anarchy,  and 
inasmuch  as  Secretary  Root  has  said  that  the  naval  stations 
will  not  be  used  for  vantage  poiats  of  intervention,  but  only  to 
protect  Cuba  against  foreign  powers,  we  report  as  follows: 

"That,  in  virtue  of  the  fact  that  the  Piatt  law  in  its  pre- 
amble says  it  is  a  fulfillment  of  the  Joint  Resolution,  and  has 
been  adopted  by  Congress  with  the  principal  object  of  estab- 
lishing independence,  we  do  propose  to  the  Convention  to  accept 
the  following  as  an  appendix  to  the  Constitution." 

The  Robinson  narration  continues  as  follows: 

"The  first,  second,  fourth,  and^  lifth  clauses  of  the  Piatt 
Amendment  are  quoted  in  their  entirety.  The  third  clause  has 
the  following  addition: 

''^  ''  It  being  understood  that  the  United  States  have  the  right  to 
intervene  to  prevent  the  action  of  a  foreign  power  or  disturbances  caus- 
ing a  state  of  anarchy,  and  that  the  intervention  shall  always  be  ihe  act 
of  the  United  States,  and  not  of  isolated  agents.  The  intervention 
shall  suppose  neither  sovereignty  nor  a  protectorate,  and  shall  last  onl\ 
sufficiently  long  to  establish  normal  conditions.  Said  intervention,  it 
is  also  understood,  shall  not  have  the  right  to  interfere  in  the  Govern- 
ment, but  only  the  right  to  preserve  independence. ' 


26 

"An  addition  to  the  sixth  clause  says  that  the  Ownership  of 
the  Isle  of  Pines  shall  be  settled  by  a  future  treaty. 
"An  addition  to  the  seventh  clause  says: 

"  'It  sliall  be  understood  that  the  naval  stations  do  not  give 
the  United  States  the  right  to  intervene  in  the  interior  govern- 
ment, but  are  established  with  the  sole  purpose  of  protecting 
American  waters  from  foreign  invasion  directed  against  Cuba 
or  the  United  States.  Cuba  will  sell  or  lease  the  necessary 
land  at  points  to  be  agreed  upon  later.' 

"An  addition  to  the  eighth  clause  says  that  the  Government 
of  Cuba  suggests  at  the  same  time  a  treaty  of  commerce  based 
upon  reciprocity. 

' '  The  accepted  report  was  also  made  to  include  a  letter  addresed  to 
Secretary  Root  by  Senator  Flatt,  a  copy  of  which  had  been  given  to 
Mendez  Capote  while  the  Commission  was  in  Washington.  The  letter 
was  as  folloivs  : 

"  '/  am  in  receipt  of  your  letter  of  this  date  {April  26),  in  which 
you  sax  that  the  members  of  the  Commission  of  the  Cuban  Constitu- 
tional Convention  fear  that  the  provisions  relative  to  intervention,  made 
in  the  third  clause  of  the  Amendment  which  has  come  to  bear  my  name, 
may  have  the  effect  of  preventing  the  independence  of  Cuba,  and  in 
reality  establish  a  protectorate  or  suzerainty  by  the  United  States;  and 
you  request  that  I  express  my  views  on  the  questions  raised.  In  reply  I 
beg  to  state  that  the  Amendment  was  carefully  prepared  with  the  object 
of  avoiding  any  possible  idea  that  by  the  acceptance  thereof  the  Consti- 
tutional Convention  will  thereby  establish  a  protectorate  or  suzerainty, 
or  in  any  manner  whatsoever  compromise  the  independence  or  sover- 
eignty of  Cicba;  and  speaking  for  myself  it  seems  impossible  that  such 
an  interpretation  can  be  given  to  the  clause.  I  believe  that  the 
Amendment  should  be  considered  as  a  whole ;  and  it  ought  to  be 
clear  on  reading  it  that  its  well-defined  purpose  is  to  secure  and 
safeguard  Cuban  independence  and  set  forth  at  once  a  clear 
idea  of  the  friendly  disposition  of  the  I'nited  States  toward  the 
Cuban  people,  and  the  express  intention  on  their  part  to  aid 
them  if  necessary  in  the  maintenance  of  said  independence. 
These  are  my  ideas;  and  although,  as  you  say,  I  cannot  speak 
for  the  entire  Congress,  my  belief  is  that  such  a  purpose  was 
well  understood  by  that  body.' 

"  This  act  of  the  Convention  encountered  the  disapproval  of 
the  authorities  in  Washington.  After  several  conferences 
between  the  President,  Secretary  Root,  and  Senator  O.  H.  Piatt 
and  Senator  Spooner,  it  was  decided  at  a  Cabinet  meeting  to 
notify  the  Convention  that  its  action  could  not  be  regarded  as 
a  satisfactory  compliance  witli  tlie  American  requirements. 
Instructions  were  therefore  telegraphed  to  General  Wood  to  inform  the 
Convention  that  it  could  not  proceed  with  the  work  of  establishing  a 
government,  and  that  the  troops  would  not  be  withdrawn  until  the  Piatt 
Amendment  had  been  accepted  without  qualifications.  " 


27 

On  June  12,  1901,  the  convention  voted  to  accept  the 
amendment  without  ciuaHlication. 

The  foregoing  official  statements  (quoted  by  Mr.  Rcjbin- 
son  are  set  forth  as  a  record  of  the  known  declarations  of  this 
Government  concerning  the  reasons,  force,  and  scope  of  the 
amendment.  It  will  he  observed,  however,  that  these  state- 
ments concerning  the  interpretation  of  Article  HI  are  so 
general  in  their  nature  as  to  furnish  little  certain  warrant  for 
a  precise  definition  of  "intervention"  at  the  present  time.  It 
may  be  said,  however,  that,  negatively  at  least,  they  are  no 
obstacle  to  adopting  the  broader  meaning  of  "intervention" 
now  under  discussion. 

The  report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1901  contains 
practically  no  information  which  would  shed  light  upon  the 
present  question  in  addition  to  that  given  in  the  Robinson 
narrative.  It  contains  the  letter  of  February  9,  1901,  sent 
to  Military  Governor  Wood  and  the  despatch  to  Governor 
Wood  of  April  3,  1901,  which  have  already  been  quoted. 
No  comment  is  made  on  these  instructions. 

A  request  was  made  by  the  writer  of  this  memorandum 
to  the  Insular  Bureau  of  the  War  Department  for  any  record 
which  the  Bureau  might  have  either  in  regard  to  the  confer- 
ence between  the  commission  of  the  Cuban  convention  and 
the  Secretary  of  War  of  April  25,  1901,  or  in  general  con- 
cerning the  War  Department's  interpretation  of  the  terms  of 
Article  III.  The  Insular  Bureau  reported  that  a  search  of 
its  records  and  of  the  records  of  the  olficc  of  the  Secretary 
of  War  showed  nothing  in  addition  to  the  data  hitherto  set 
forth  obtained  from  other  sources. 

REPORT  ON  "CUBAN  T.-VCl  FK  ATK  ).\  ",  i;V  SECRETARY  OF  WAR 
TAFT  AND  ASSISTANT  SECRETARY  OF  STATE  BACON  OF  DE- 
CEMBER    I  I,    1906. 

The  report  described  in  the  foregoing  caption  is  one  of 
the  action  taken  by  the  officers  mentioned,  under  the  direc- 
tion of  the  President,  in  assisting  to  bring  about  peace  in 
Cuba  during  the  period  from   the  14th  of  September  to  the 


28 

13th  of  October,  1906,  at  which  latter  date  the  officers  left 
Cuba,  the  Provisional  Government  of  Cuba  having  in  the 
meantime  been  established  under  the  Piatt  Amendment. 

As  apposite  to  the  present  question,  reference  may  be 
made  to  the  following  correspondence  set  forth  on  pages  445 
to  446  of  the  report,  which  would  seem  to  indicate  that  in 
the  minds  of  the  writers  there  mioht  be  under  Article  III 
various  kinds  of  "  intervention  ". 

"Department  of  State, 

""  Washingtoji^  September  10,  igo6. 
"Steinhart,  Habana: 

"Your  cable  received.  Two  ships  have  been  sent,  due  to 
arrive  Wednesday.  The  President  directs  me  to  state  that  per- 
haps you  do  not  yourself  appreciate  the  reluctance  with  which 
this  country  would  intervene.  President  Palma  should  be 
informed  that  in  the  public  opinion  here  it  would  have  a  most 
damaging  effect  for  intervention  to  be  undertaken  until  the 
Cuban  Government  has  exhausted  every  effort  in  a  serious 
attempt  to  put  down  the  insurrection  and  has  made  this  fact 
evident  to  the  world.  At  present  the  impression  certainly 
would  be  that  there  was  no  real  popular  support  of  the 
Cuban  Government  or  else  that  the  Government  was 
hopelessly  weak.  As  conditions  at-e  at  this  motnent  tve  are  not  pre- 
pared to  say  what  shape  the  intervention  should  take.  It  is,  of  course, 
a  very  serious  thing  to  undertake  forcible  intervention,  and  before  going 
into  it  we  should  have  to  be  absolutely  certain  of  the  equities  of  the  case 
and  of  the  needs  of  the  situation.  Meanwhile  we  assume  that  every 
effort  is  being  made  b}'  the  Government  to  come  to  a  working 
agreement  which  will  secure  peace  vviih  the  insurrectos,  pro- 
vided they  are  unable  to  hold  their  own  with  them  in  the  field. 
Until  such  efforts  have  been  made  we  are  not  prepared  to  con- 
sider the  question  of  intervention  at  all. 

"  Bacon,  Acting  Secretary." 

"Department  of  State, 

''September  11,  igo6. 
"  Steinhart, 

''American  Consul- General,  Habana: 

"  Your  letter  of  Septetnber  jfh  has  had  the  careful  consideration  of 
the  President,  who,  for  your  private  information,  believes  actual,  imme- 
diate intervention  to  be  out  of  the  question.  We  are  considering, 
however,  and  would  like  your  opinion,  as  to  whether  or  not  to 


send  a  word  of  emphatic  warning  as  to  the  certainty  that  inter- 
vention will  come  in  the  end  unless  the  people  of  Cuba,  for  the 
sake  of  their  country,  find  some  way  to  settle  their  difficulties, 
irrespective  of  personalities,  cease  their  contentions,  and  live  in 
peace.  This  you  may  convey  confidentially  to  President  Palma, 
but  not  for  publication.  Vou  will  urge  President  Palma  to  use 
in  the  most  effective  manner  all  the  resources  at  his  command 
to  quell  the  revolt. 

"Bacon." 

"  Habana,  September  lo,  igo6. 
"Secretary  of  State, 
' '  Washington  : 
"  Your  cable  received  and  directly  cofnmunicated  to  the  President, 
who  asks  ships  remain  for  a  considerable  time  to  give  security 
to  foreigners  in  the  island  of  Cuba,  and  says  that  he  loill  do  as 
much  as  possible  7vith  his  forces  to  put  down  insurrection,  but  if  unable 
to  conquer  or  cotnpromise  Cuban  Congress  will  indicate  kind  of  ititerven- 
tion  desirable.  I  appreciate  reluctance  on  our  part  to  intervene, 
especially  in  view  of  Secretary  Root's  recent  statements.  Few, 
however,  understand  Cuban  situation  and  a  less  number  are 
able  to  appreciate  the  same.  This  is,  of  course,  without  any 
reference  to  superior  authority.  Palma  applied  public  funds  in 
public  works  and  public  education,  but  not  in  purchase  war 
material.  Insurrectionists  for  a  considerable  time  prepared  for 
present  condition,  hence  Government's  apparent  weakness  at 
the  commencement.  Yesterday's  defeat  of  rebels  gives  the 
Government  hope.      Attempts  useless  from  the  start. 

"  S  T  e  1 N  H  A  R  T ,  Consul-  General. ' ' 

Reference  in  this  same  connection  mav  also  be  made  to 
the  following  extracts  from  an  opinion  of  the  Judge  Advo- 
cate General,  dated  September  15,  1906,  concerning  the 
force  and  operation  of  Article  III  of  the  treaty,  which  ap- 
pears at  page  494  of  the  report : 

"It  is  assumed,  for  purposes  of  discussion,  that  an  insur- 
rectionary movement  has  come  into  being  in  the  island  of 
Cuba  with  which  the  Cuban  Government  is  powerless  to  deal; 
it  is  also  assumed  that  the  existence  of  such  conditions  has 
become  known  to  the  President  either  as  the  result  of  his  own 
observations  or  of  authoritative  representations  which  have 
been  made  to  him,  or  upon  the  admission  of  the  Government 
of  Cuba  that  it  has  exhausted   its  powers  and  is  unable,  by  its 


30 

own  agencies  and    instrumentalities,  to   maintain   order  in   the 
island. 

'*  Upon  the  happening  and  tuUiUment  of  the  conditions  above 
described  the  duty  of  intervention  with  a  view  to  the  establish- 
ment and  maintenance  of  public  order  will  have  accrued,  /n 
the  execution  of  the  interi'ention  the  first  steps  are  or  may  be  political 
and  advisory.  The  Goveriuiioit  and  people  of  the  island  may  be  offi- 
cially notified  of  the  power  and  duty  of  the  Executive  under  the  treaty^ 
and  negotiations  may  be  undertaken  with  a  view  to  the  restoration  of 
order  by  pacific  methods^  or  by  a  resort  to  good  offices,  or  by  a  compro- 
mise, or  a  redress  of  grievances.  J f  these  methods  faiL  however,  the 
next  step  in  execution  will  consist  in  the  issue  of  a  proclamation  by  the 
President  calling  upon  all  persons  composing  insurrectionary  combina- 
tions to  disperse  and  retire  peaceably  to  their  respective  abodes  within  a 
specified  number  of  days  from  the  date  of  such  proclamation." 

As  showing  the  same  general  trend  of  thought,  reference 
may  also  be  made  to  a  letter  addressed  to  the  Peace  Com- 
missioners  by  Alfredo  Zeyas,  representing  the  Cuban  Liberal 
party,  concerning  a  peace  proposal  which  had  recently  been 
made.  The  pertinent  part  of  the  letter,  for  the  present  pur- 
poses, reads  as  follows : 

' '  They  [the  Moderate  party]  knoio  that  President  Roosevelt  and  the 
American  people  wished  to  avoid  armed  intervention  in  Cuba,  and  they 
proposed  to  force  that  intervention,  their  plans  even  going  to 
the  extreme  of  provoking  it  by  insurrectionary  acts  of  their 
guerillas  and  militia,  by  attacks  on  American  detachments,  and 
by  burning  foreign  property.  We  formally  call  your  attention 
to  these  plans,  and  you  will  remember  that  several  days  ago  I 
advised  you  of  the  possibility  that  deeds  of  this  kind  might  be 
committed  in  Cienfuegos. 

'■^ Armed  intervention  would  be  for  us,  sincere  friends  of  the 
Atnericans  but  ardent  friends  of  liberty  and  national  dignity,  a  sad 
event,  though  we  may  respect  and  accept  it  as  a  means,  painful 
to  vou  also,  to  attain  the  end  we  both  desire.-  For  this  reason 
we  earnestly  beg  you  to  try  to  avoid  it,  and  that  inasjnach  as  the 
Piatt  Amendmetit  establishes  neither  the  form  nor  extent  of  interven- 
tion by  your  Government,  it  be  limited  so  long  as  other  occur- 
rences do  not  determine  more  direct  and  efficacious  action,  to 
order  the  institution  of  a  provisional  president  designated  in 
the  proclamation  and  empowered  to  act  in  accordance  with  the 
law  in  all  matters  relating  to  administration;  but  such  procla- 
mation  should   likewise  contain   the   necessary  provisions   that 


31 

shall  enable  a  gradual  termination  of  the  transitory  period,  and 
such  proclamation  shall  approach  existing  law  in  so  far  as  may 
be  compatible,  although  ignoring  the  i)recepts  of  such  laws 
wherever  necessary." 

RECENT    RESOLUTIONS    IN    CONGRESS. 

An  exaniinalion  has  been  made  of  ihe  discussion  repoi  ted 
in  ihe  Congressional  Record  concerning  a  resolution  and  a  bill 
introduced  by  Senators  Nelson  and  Bacon,  respectively,  on 
June  8  and  lo  in  regard  to  the  pending  Cuban  disturbances. 
This  discussion,  however,  was  found  to  be  not  helpful  with 
respect  to  the  question  under  consideration. 

Finally,  reference  may  be  made  to  the  fact  that  recent 
newspaper  reports  evidence  a  growing  custom  to  speak  of 
"fiscal  intervention"  as  distinguished  from  "military  inter- 
vention". For  example,  an  article  in  the  New  York  Amer- 
ican, dated  Habana,  June  25,  reads  in  part  as  follows: 

"  It  is  stated  here  that  Washington  is  in  possession  of  facts 
concerning  conditions  here  which  demand  both  fiscal  and  military 
intervention. " 


CASES   OF  MALADMINISTRATION   OF  CUBAN 

FINANCE. 


Improvident  Concession  Contracts. 


The  following-  is  a  rough  list  of  the  principal  cases  of 
maladministration  of  Cuban  finance  which  have  occurred  or 
been  proposed  during  the  Gomez  administration.  The  list 
does  not  purport  to  be  a  complete  one  of  the  class  of  cases 
chosen,  and,  moreover,  takes  no  account  of  the  various  minor 
cases  of  the  same  nature  which  have  from  time  to  time  been 
reported  by  the  American  legation  at  Habana.  The  de- 
scriptions of  the  projects  are,  of  course,  only  of  a  very  gen- 
eral nature.  The  list  includes  pending  projects,  projects 
which  have  been  defeated,  and  projects  which  have  gone 
through. 

I.     PORTS    IMPROVEMENT    PROJECT. 

This  is  a  law  which  was  rushed  through  the  Cuban  Con- 
gress providing  for  the  dredging  and  improving  of  Cuban 
ports,  whereby  in  return  for  work  which  has  been  estimated 
would  cost  not  over  $12,500,000  the  concessionary  compan\' 
is' given,  for  a  period  of  30  years,  the  right  to  collect  all  ton- 
nage dues  paid  in  Cuban  ports  at  new  advanced  rates  pro- 
vided for  in  the  bill.  The  present  estimates  of  the  annual 
•revenue  from  this  tax  show  it  amounts  to  over  $1,000,000, 
which  fio^ure  will,  of  course,  constant Iv  increase  with  the 
development  of  Cuban  trade,  and  will  greatly  increase  after 
the  opening  of  the  Panama  Canal.  Upon  the  basis  of  the 
present  revenue  the  comj-tanx'  will,  at  the  vcrv  latest,  be 
reimbursed  for  its  work  during  half  the  life  of  the  concession 
and  consequentlv  will  take  all  the  revenues  of  the  latter  half 

33 


34 

of  the  concession  as  clear  profit.  There  are  other  consider- 
able sources  of  profit  in  the  contract.  The  Department  is 
now  endeavoring  to  have  the  contract  amended  and  put  upon 
an  equitable  basis. 

2.    CAIBARIEN-NUEVITAS    RAILWAV    CONCESSION. 

During  tlie  past  year  or  so  a  number  of  railway  projects 
have  been  mooted  under  which  the  Cuban  Government  was 
to  give  substantial  assistance  to  companies  or  persons  who 
should  undertake  railway  construction  in  Cuba,  y\gainst 
the  Department's  protest  a  bill  was  recently  passed  by  the 
Cuban  Congress  authorizing  the  construction  of  the  Caiba- 
rien-Nuevitas  Railway  under  a  subvention  of  about  $10,000 
per  mile.  It  is  said  that  this  subvention  will  more  than 
suffice  for  the  construction  of  the  road.  Consequently  Cuba 
is  to  pay  for  the  road  which  will  be  owned  and  operated  by 
the  concessionaire.  It  has  been  said,  however,  that  the  sub- 
vention is  not  payable  until  about  191  7. 

3.    COMPULSORY    IRRIGATION    PROJECT. 

In  xA.pril,  191 1,  a  bill  was  introduced  in  the  Cuban  Con- 
gress providing  for  a  scheme  of  compulsory  irrigation.  The 
work  of  installing  an  irrigation  system,  to  cost  about 
$25,000,000,  was  to  be  let  to  a  concessionary  company.  To 
this  company  a  concession  was  to  be  given  for  sixty  years, 
during  the  life  of  which  it  should  have  the  right  to  collect 
various  taxes  graded  according  to  the  kinds  of  crops  raised 
by  the  cultivators.  As  indicated  by  the  title  of  the  bill  irri- 
gation was  to  be  compulsory.  The  Department  instructed 
the  legation  to  register  a  protest  against  the  bill  as  loosely 
drawn,  ill  advised,  and  improvident.  This  bill  appears  to 
have  been  shelved.  Thereafter,  a  commission  was  appointed 
to  study  the  irrigation  problem.  Following  upon  this  the 
Department  has  had  presented  for  its  consideration  a  new 
irrigation  project  which  purports  to  solve  the  problem  by 
furnishing  a  cheap  fuel  to  be  used  by  irrigators  in  power 
engines  employed  to  pump  water  for  irrigation  from  wells. 


35 


4-     PETROLKIM     MONOPOLY     PROJErT. 

The  hill  indicated  in  the  concluding  portion  of  the  pre- 
ceding section  is  one  recently  introduced  in  the  Cuhan  Con- 
gress  giving  the  concessionary  conipanx  the  right  to  import 
crude  petroleum  and  its  dci^ivatives  free  of  all  import  duties, 
which  duties  at  present  are  reported  to  amount  to  over  200 
j)er  cent  ad  valorem.  This  privilege  of  free  import  is  granted 
as  an  exclusive  concession  t(j  the  concessionary  company  and 
gives  it  a  practical  monopol)'  of  the  oil  trade  in  Cuba.  \w 
return  for  this  privilege  the  company  is  to  install  a  storage 
and  distributing  system  for  fuel  oil  (which  system  is  said  to 
be  necessary  in  order  to  make  the  use  of  oil  fuel  practicable 
in  Cuba),  and  agrees  to  sell  to  irrigators  all  (jil  used  as  fuel 
at  cost. 

The  various  drafts  of  the  bill  which  have  so  far  been 
examined  by  the  Department  leave  the  impression  that  the 
company  will  derive  a  handsome  revenue  from  its  concession. 
In  the  drafts  of  the  bill  first  submitted  to  the  Department 
the  obligations  of  the  concessionaire  were  so  vaguely  defined 
as  to  leave  it  open  to  the  concessionaire  to  furnish  little  or 
no  consideration  for  its  privileges.  The  last  draft  submitted  is 
far  from  satisfactory  in  this  respect.  It  is  estimated  that  on 
the  basis  of  the  present  importations  under  the  excessively 
high  duty,  the  company's  annual  profit  would  amount  to  at 
least  $400,000. 

5.    SANITATION     AND     PUBLIC    IMPROVEMENT    EXPENDITURES 
FROM    THE    $16,000,000    SPEVER    LOAN. 

For  some  time  past  the  Department  has  received  com- 
plaints from  various  contractors  employed  to  do  the  work, 
under  the  sanitation  and  public  improvement  contracts  pro- 
jected in  connection  with  the  $16,000,000  Spe^er  loan  to 
the  effect  that  they  were  unable  to  secure  the  payment  of 
current  accounts  and  were  ajiprehensive  as  to  future  pay- 
ments because  of  theii  information  that  the  proceeds  of  the 
loan,  instead  of  being  applied  to  the  payment  for  work  done 
under  the  contracts,  were   being   flittered    awa\-   to   pay  the 


36 

salaries  of  a  huge  force  of  polilical  personnel  in  the  Cuban 
Department  of  Public  Works.  The  legation  reported,  for 
example,  with  respect  to  the  work  of  extending  and  improv- 
ing the  water  supply  of  Habana,  that  of  the  $2,000,000  ap- 
propriated for  this  item  of  improvement  about  $700,000 
had  been  expended,  of  which  latter  sum  half  has  gone  to 
pay  personnel;  or,  in  other  words,  that  the  personnel  charge 
has  been  50  per  cent  rather  than  the  10  per  cent  originally 
estimated.  It  is  said  that  the  monthly  charge  of  the  Depart- 
ment of  Public  Works  is  about  $40,000,  and  that  if  this 
charge  continues  it  will  not  be  long  before  the  loan  proceeds 
will  be  exhausted  without  the  payment  for  the  work  origi- 
nally contemplated.  It  has  been  reported  that  the  Cuban 
Government  is  desirous  of  floating  a  new  loan  of  $1 1,000,000 
to  provide  for  the  obligations  of  these  contracts. 

6.    HEYDRICH    CONCESSION    FOR    THE  VENTO    WATER    WORKS. 

In  June,  191 1,  the  Department  had  occasion  to  consider 
a  bill  introduced  in  the  Cuban  Congress  granting  to  Alfredo 
Heydrich  a  concession  for  the  construction  and  operation  of 
the  Vento  Water  Works,  a  part  of  the  proposed  Habana 
water-works  .system.  The  bill  appeared  to  be  ill-advised  and 
improvident.  It  was  alleged  that  the  annual  profit  to  the  con- 
cessionaire, the  total  expenditure  called  for  being  $2,000,000, 
would  amount  to  $835,000.  The  legation  protested  and  the 
bill  did  not  fjo  throui^^h. 

7.     PAULA    WHARVES    CONCESSION. 

In  December,  1910,  the  Cuban  Government  entered  into 
an  arrangement  with  the  United  Railways  Co.  of  Habana 
whereby  it  transferred  the  "Arsenal"  water-front  property 
owned  by  fhe  Government  in  exchange  for  the  "  Villanueva" 
property  owned  by  the  comj)any.  Since,  under  the  assessed 
valuations  of  the  two  properties,  the  "Arsenal"  property  was 
valued  at  $1,500,000  more  than  the  "\^illanueva"  property,  it 
was  stipulated  that  the  company  should  pay  for  certain  i)ul)lic 
improvements  for  the  city  of   Habana,  among  which  were 


three  slccl  and  concrete  piers  and  warehouses  on  the  site  of 
the  old  Paula  wharves.  Recently  it  was  reported  that  Presi- 
dent Gomez  had  issued  a  decree  grantin^j^  a  concession  for 
the  operation  of  these  wharves  to  one  Leopoldo  Autran,  a 
customhouse  broker,  who  was  said  to  be  a  "dummy"  for 
other  interests.  The  one  consideration  moving  from  the 
concessionaire  was  his  agreement  to  defray  the  charges  of 
maintenance  of  the  wharves  during  the  life  of  the  concession, 
which  was  30  years.  I-*rotest  by  the  legation,  coujjled  with 
the  pressure  of  local  public  opinion,  resulted  in  the  cancella- 
tion of  the  decree. 

8.    RODRIGUEZ    HANK-NOTE    CONTRACT. 

Last  summer  the  Department  received  a  complaint  from 
the  American  Bank-Note  Company,  which  then  had  the 
contract  for  printing  Cuban  revenue  stamps,  that  it  had  been 
approached  by  a  person  said  to  be  near  the  President  of 
Cuba  with  a  proposition  to  pay  to  this  individual  for  his 
principals  a  substantial  sum  in  consideration  of  the  renewal 
of  the  company's  expiring  contract.  This  was  accompanied 
by  a  threat  to  place  the  contract  elsewhere  if  this  sum  were 
not  given.  Subsequently  the  contract  was  given  without 
any  public  bidding  to  one  "Pote"  Rodriguez,  the  printer  of 
the  Cuban  lottery  tickets,  who  was  claimed  to  have  entirely 
inadequate  facilities  for  executing  the  work  in  question. 

9.     PURCHASE    OF    MILITARY    TRAINING    GROUND. 

The  legation  recently  reported  that  a  deal  had  been 
brought  to  its  attention  in  which  one  Barlow  had  engaged 
with  President  Gomez  to  sell  to  Cuba  land  needed  for  a 
military  training  ground  valued  at  $200,000  for  the  price  of 
$350,000.  It  was  said  that  this  deal  was  not  consummated 
because  interference  from  "Washington"  was  apprehended. 

10.    ZAPATA    MARSH    CONCESSION, 

Very  recently  the  legation  has  reported  that  a  concession 
is   proposed   whereby   the    privilege   of  exploitation   of  the 


38 

Zapata  marsh,  a  territory  of  i,ooo  square  miles  principally 
public  land,  is  to  be  given  in  perpetuity  to  private  interests. 
This  is  said  to  he  a  "reclamation"  project.  It  is  reported  by 
the  legation,  however,  that  the  object  of  the  concession  is  to 
give  to  the  concessionaire  the  privilege  of  exploiting  the 
very  valuable  timber  on  the  land  and  the  material  used  in  the 
manufacture  of  charcoal,  the  universal  cooking  fuel  in  Cuba. 
In  addition  to  the  loss  of  the  timber  the  Government  would 
lose  by  the  concession  what  is  said  to  be  a  present  consider- 
able revenue  derived  from  permits  for  the  taking  of  charcoal 
material.  The  alleged  consideration  moving  from  the  con- 
cessionaire is  its  undertaking  to  drain  and  reclaim  the  land. 
It  is  reported,  however,  that  as  the  concession  is  drafted  the 
concessionaire  may  freely  avail  itself  of  the  benefits  of  the 
concession  while  failing  with  impunity  to  perform  any  of  its 
"obligations". 


MfjiHn.Hlf^^,!?'^,f?''(?'9^''i'-'B''*'^>'''*CILITY 


AA    000  630  847    2 


